An Analysis of the UK Regulators’ Code and the Effectiveness of Financial Regulation
Abstract: The new UK Regulators’ Code (“the Code”), published by the Better Regulation Delivery Office in April 2014, marks a movement towards reducing regulatory burdens in a bid to better support economic growth. It claims to provide a new flexible and principled framework to ensure regulators devise and enforce regulations that best suit the needs of the business and financial markets. This paper analyses the framework by evaluating the feasibility of its application and the implications that may arise. The paper makes recommendations on alternatives to present regulation, stressing the great need to engender a culture of ethics within the financial services industry. Such a culture should be pervasive amongst individuals and embedded within internal governance structures of firms and entities.
Introduction
The sphere of regulation relating to constraining undesirable behavior[1] of individuals and corporations has always undergone constant evolution. With the unprecedented growth of financial markets, these changes have become more revolutionary than evolutionary, where regulation has become an instrumental tool in exerting institutional control over what is an extremely volatile industry. The inception of the Regulators’ Code (“the Code”) is one such revolution, perhaps more so than previous regulatory instruments. Rather than imposing greater controls, the Code significantly subverts the function of regulation. Through an analysis of the Code’s substantive content, this paper identifies a gap of enforcement between conventional regulation and the entities that it seeks to regulate. Such a gap in embodying issues may result in lackadaisical enforcement. However, this paper seeks to reconcile the gap by engaging in a theoretical discussion on the role of culture and ethics as “extra-contractual or extra-legal gap fillers”[2]. The way forward in constraining socially undesirable activities may be through a form of self-regulation within individuals and corporations. However, this paper does not seek to provide a foolproof solution. Rather, it aspires to provide an alternative perspective to