Moral Sense, Theory of

Proponents of the theory of moral sense claim that the basis of morality is in moral sentiments, or a special moral sense.  To put it another way, we intuitively perceive things to be moral or immoral with what might be called “a sense for the moral,” just as we use our sense of hearing to perceive sounds and our sense of smell to perceive odors.

Classically, versions of this position were argued by several notable philosophers of the early modern period, including Francis Hutcheson, David Hume, and Adam Smith, the renowned philosopher and economist.  Recently, the view has been imbued with new life from the biological and psychological sciences.

Of the classical theories of moral sentiment, Hume’s theory is perhaps the most influential.  Hume argued that moral evaluations arise from our sentiments.  When we observe a morally praiseworthy or blameworthy action, that action produces in us a corresponding feeling of approval or disapproval.  In this way the moral sentiments are emotions.

The emotion primarily involved with, and responsible for, these feelings is sympathy.  Sympathy allows us to “put ourselves in their shoes” when we observe the suffering or pleasure that others experience.    According to Hume, when we witness human suffering we are moved by feelings of sympathy to disapprove of the cause of the suffering, because we can imagine ourselves in that position.   Thus, we morally disapprove of harming others because our feeling of sympathy is stirred by instances of violence.

Likewise, when we observe a morally praiseworthy act, we approve of it due to sympathy.   When witnessing an act of charity, for instance, sympathy moves us to feelings of pleasure or approval.

For many years, this and other versions of moral sense theory fell out of favor.  However, recent developments in the sciences have led to renewed discussions about ‘moral sense.’  Harvard psychologist Steven Pinkner, in a 2008 New York Times article entitled “The Moral Instinct,” explains that findings in psychology have led scholars and scientists

“to revive an analogy from the philosopher John Rawls between the moral sense and language. According to Noam Chomsky, we are born with a “universal grammar” that forces us to analyze speech in terms of its grammatical structure, with no conscious awareness of the rules in play. By analogy, we are born with a universal moral grammar that forces us to analyze human action in terms of its moral structure, with just as little awareness.

“The idea that the moral sense is an innate part of human nature is not far-fetched. A list of human universals collected by the anthropologist Donald E. Brown includes many moral concepts and emotions, including a distinction between right and wrong; empathy; fairness; admiration of generosity; rights and obligations; proscription of murder, rape and other forms of violence; redress of wrongs; sanctions for wrongs against the community; shame; and taboos”

The developments outlined by Pinkner are intriguing and offer fertile ground for new inquiries – for both philosophers and scientists – into the nature of our moral life.  However, Pinkner himself admits that “the moral sense… may be rooted in the design of the normal human brain. Yet for all the awe that may fill our minds when we reflect on an innate moral law within, the idea is at best incomplete.”